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California and the Terrible, Horrible,
No Good, Very Bad Statutory
Employee Classification Scheme
Richard H. Gilliland III*
Abstract
The battle over worker classification between state
governments, on the one hand, and gig economy companies, on
the other, has raged since at least the first time someone ordered
an Uber. Nowhere has this battle played out more prominently
in recent years than in California. In 2019, the state legislature
passed AB 5, a bill which adopted a stringent independent
contractor standard and effectively classified all gig economy
workers as employees of the companies whose apps they use to
find work. AB 5’s ripple effects were enormous—the significant
popularity of gig economy apps among consumers launched what
might have been obscure, legalistic wrangling about worker
classification standards to the forefront of the public
consciousness. The bill’s passage engendered public outcry, legal
challenges, media hysterics, and a record-breaking referendum
initiative whose outcome is still the subject of litigation. In a
sense, strong reactions to a bill like AB 5 are to be
expected— worker classification schemes strike at the heart of
individuals’ ability to earn income and to receive certain
protections and benefits reserved only for employees. But largely
missing from the fevered debate over AB 5 has been a close
examination of the bill’s place in the long history of worker
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classification jurisprudence, its effectiveness as reform, and its
viability to accomplish its own aims. This Note attempts to do
just that and concludes that California AB 5 should not serve as
a model for other states seeking to address the challenges the gig
economy poses to existing worker classification schemes.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, a company developed a smartphone app that
offered to connect licensed San Francisco limousine drivers to
additional potential clients in their downtime between regularly
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scheduled appointments.1 The company situated itself as a
platform facilitating the efficient use of resources—one that
would provide on-demand rides to customers while
simultaneously supplementing the incomes of full-time
professional drivers.2 Readers may recognize that company as
Uber. In short order, Uber expanded its platform to allow
virtually anyone with a driver’s license and a vehicle to provide
rides whenever they felt like logging on.3 Cheap, seamless rides
for passengers and flexible earning opportunities for anyone
who could drive and pass a background check4—that was the
vision Uber sought to achieve.5 The idea caught on quickly
among riders and drivers alike, and by 2011 Uber began to
expand to other cities across the globe.6
Throughout its expansion, Uber always expressly
proclaimed not to have hired any drivers as employees.7 To
casual drivers, Uber might have seemed like a low-stakes
opportunity to earn supplemental income. To professional
full-time drivers, accepting a trip through the Uber app might
have seemed no different than accepting a booking assigned by
1. See Avery Hartmans & Paige Leskin, The History of How Uber Went
from the Most Feared Startup in the World to Its Massive IPO, BUS. INSIDER
(May 18, 2019, 2:42 PM), https://perma.cc/6DJD-7EWA (“March 2009:
[Garrett] Camp and two graduate school friends . . . build the first version of
their black-car service, called UberCab.”).
2. See Travis Kalanick, Principled Innovation: Addressing the
Regulatory
Ambiguity,
UBER
TECHS.,
INC.
(Apr.
12,
2013),
https://perma.cc/2Y26-NTEB (PDF) (“Uber provides city residents with a
convenient and efficient way to request transportation services from existing
transportation providers.”).
3. See id. (stating that Uber chose to compete in the non-professional
driver ridesharing space because other companies had begun to do so without
regulatory penalty).
4. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1136 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (“Applicants are required to upload their driver’s license
information, as well as information about their vehicle’s registration and
insurance. . . . Applicants must also pass a background check conducted by a
third party.” (citation omitted)).
5. See Kalanick, supra note 2 (“In theory, ridesharing is generally good
for cities and for society as a whole: cheaper, more reliable transportation for
city residents, and more jobs for drivers.”).
6. See Hartmans & Leskin, supra note 1 (“December 2011: Uber begins
to expand internationally, starting with Paris, France.”).
7. See id. (“Although Uber does not own cars and does not employ
drivers . . . .”).
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their primary limousine company employer. But curiously,
formerly non-professional drivers who began to drive forty or
more hours per week, and who relied on the Uber app—or the
Lyft app, a competitor that used the same non-professional
driver model—as their sole source of income, would soon come
to assert that they were in fact Uber or Lyft employees, and as
such that they were entitled to a minimum wage,
unemployment insurance, and a host of other benefits typically
reserved for individuals so classified.8
This narrative is not unique to Uber and Lyft. Technological
advancement and the rise of so-called “gig economy” companies
have strained twentieth-century understandings of the
distinction between employees and independent contractors,
raising questions as to whether existing legal standards are
robust enough to appropriately maintain that distinction in the
twenty-first century.9 Consequently, some state and local
legislatures have undertaken efforts to reform their
employment law in response to large numbers of workers
contending that they have been wrongfully or “mis-” classified
as independent contractors in the modern economy.10

8. See, e.g., O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1136 (“[P]laintiffs . . . drive
principally for Uber’s ‘uberX’ service . . . [through which] drivers transport
passengers in their own personal vehicles . . . .”); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F.
Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The question in this case is whether
Lyft drivers are ‘employees’ or ‘independent contractors’ under California
law.”).
9. See, e.g., Robert Sprague, Worker (Mis)classification in the Sharing
Economy: Trying to Fit Square Pegs into Round Holes, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 53, 54 (2015) (“[C]urrent classification tests . . . fail when applied to new,
sharing-economy enterprises, specifically Lyft and Uber.”).
10. See Gov. Northam Signs New Laws to Support Virginia Workers,
NBC12 (Apr. 12, 2020, 4:22 PM), https://perma.cc/3PRN-HVY5 (“House Bill
984 . . . creates a private cause of action for a misclassified worker to bring
civil action for damages against his or her employer.”); Alexia Fernández
Campbell, New York City Passes Nation’s First Minimum Pay Rate for Uber
and Lyft Drivers, VOX (Dec. 5, 2018, 2:10 PM), https://perma.cc/Z7HT-A6JS
(“[C]ity officials passed the nation’s first minimum pay rate for drivers who
work for ride-hailing apps, ending a contentious two-year battle to make sure
drivers can earn a decent living.”); Dara Kerr, Uber and Lyft Drivers Could
Become Employees with This Law: 10 Things to Know, CNET (Dec. 23, 2019,
5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/JJ8D-K294 (“Other states, like Washington,
Oregon, . . . and New Jersey, are looking at similar laws.”).
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This Note follows the story of California Assembly Bill
No. 511 (AB 5)—one state’s fraught endeavor to correct a
perceived employee misclassification problem within its
borders. AB 5 was a legislative response to a major judicial
development in state employment law.12 In 2018, the California
Supreme Court decided Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County,13 which narrowly altered
the legal standard state courts use to evaluate employment
classification.14 Before Dynamex, California courts had applied
the more flexible standard articulated in S.G. Borello & Sons,
Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations15 to all employee
classification disputes under state law.16 Dynamex involved a
dispute over the meaning of one definition of “employee” in a
wage order of the California Industrial Welfare Commission
(IWC).17 Given the remedial purpose of the wage order at issue,
the Dynamex court saw fit to break with Borello18 and require
application of a more stringent standard favoring employee

11. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5, California 2019–2020 Regular Session (Cal.
2019).
12. See id. § 1(d) (“It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act
to include provisions that would codify the decision of the California Supreme
Court in Dynamex and would clarify the decision’s application in state law.”);
see also Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018) (the
case to which AB 5 refers in this section).
13. 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
14. See id. at 40 (concluding that a new test should be used in
determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor
under the “suffer or permit to work standard” in wage orders of the California
Industrial Welfare Commission).
15. 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989).
16. See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 6 (noting that the trial court had applied
the Borello standard because, in most other contexts, Borello is the only
appropriate standard under California law for distinguishing employees and
independent contractors).
17. See id. at 5 (“Here we must decide what standard applies, under
California law, in determining whether workers should be classified as
employees or as independent contractors for purposes of California wage
orders . . . .”).
18. See id. at 7 (“[I]n light of its history and purpose, we conclude that the
wage order’s suffer or permit to work definition must be interpreted broadly
to treat as ‘employees,’ and thereby provide the wage order’s protection to, all
workers who would ordinarily be viewed as working in the hiring business.”).
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status that had cropped up in other jurisdictions: the so-called
“ABC Test.”19
Meanwhile, public discourse regarding the employment
status of gig economy workers had reached a fever pitch.20
Although Dynamex did not involve a gig economy company,21
and although the court had taken pains to cabin application of
the ABC Test only to IWC wage orders,22 the California
legislature swiftly seized upon what it saw as an opportunity to
“codify the decision . . . and clarify its application” in passing
AB 5.23 In truth, AB 5 meaningfully broadened Dynamex’s
reach.24 AB 5 requires courts to apply the more stringent ABC
Test by default in any misclassification dispute unless the
plaintiff worker is part of a group of excepted occupations.25
Those excepted occupations continue to receive treatment under

19. See id. (“[I]n determining whether, under the suffer or permit to work
definition, a worker is properly considered the type of independent contractor
to whom the wage order does not apply, it is appropriate to look to . . . the
‘ABC’ test, that is utilized in other jurisdictions . . . .”).
20. See, e.g., Abrar Al-Heeti & Andrew Morse, Uber and Lyft Drivers
Protest for Better Working Conditions, CNET (July 19, 2019, 12:55 PM),
https://perma.cc/2BJM-KTAD (noting amid driver protests in California that
the issue of gig worker classification had been simmering for years, resulted
in several lawsuits against Uber and Lyft, and caused drivers to attempt to
organize against the companies to secure employment benefits).
21. See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 5 (describing the factual background of the
case).
22. See id. at 7 (“At the same time, we conclude that the suffer or permit
to work definition is a term of art that cannot be interpreted literally in a
manner that would encompass . . . individual workers . . . who have
traditionally been viewed as genuine independent contractors . . . .”).
23. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 1(d).
24. See Cal. Trucking Ass’n v. Becerra, 433 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (S.D.
Cal. 2020) (“California’s Assembly-Bill 5 . . . codified the ABC test adopted in
Dynamex and expanded its reach to contexts beyond Wage Order No. 9,
including workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, and disability
insurance.”).
25. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 2(a)(1) (requiring application of the ABC
Test for the purposes of the Labor Code, the Unemployment Insurance Code,
and all wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission); id. § 2(b)
(“Subdivision (a) and [Dynamex] do not apply to the following occupations as
defined in the paragraphs below . . . .”).
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the Borello test.26 Gig economy workers do not fall under one of
the exceptions.27
AB 5’s passage attracted fiercely divided national political
attention,28 ignited several high-profile legal battles,29 and
resulted in threats by gig economy companies to shut down

26. See id. § 2(b) (“[D]etermination of employee or independent contractor
status for individuals in [excepted] occupations shall be governed by Borello.”).
27. See id. (listing excepted occupations but not listing gig economy
workers or any reasonably related equivalent term).
28. See Faiz Siddiqui, California Senate Passes Ride-Hail Bill that Has
Divided Democrats over the Future of Uber and Lyft Drivers, WASH. POST (Sept.
11, 2019, 3:40 PM) [hereinafter Siddiqui, California Senate],
https://perma.cc/ARG3-YDMV (noting that the bill divided Obama-era officials
who joined gig economy companies in advisory roles and newer progressive
Democrats, and that Elizabeth Warren, Pete Buttigieg, Julián Castro, and
Bernie Sanders all publicly supported the bill while Joe Biden remained
silent); id. (“Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.) scolded former California
Democratic senator Barbara Boxer, who now serves as a Lyft adviser, for
penning an opinion piece in the San Francisco Chronicle criticizing some
tenets of AB5.”); see also Barbara Boxer, Barbara Boxer: AB5 Is Not the Answer
for All Workers, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 26, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://perma.cc/P9EVUDLN (arguing, after speaking to a “representative sample” of Lyft drivers,
that those drivers shared grave concerns they’ll lose critical income if they are
forced to become employees under AB 5).
29. See Am. Soc’y of Journalists & Authors, Inc. v. Becerra, No. CV
19-10645, 2020 WL 1444909, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2020) (denying a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of AB 5 with respect to certain
independent authors); Olson v. California, No. CV 19-10956, 2020 WL 905572,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020) (“On January 8, 2020, Plaintiffs . . . Postmates
Inc. . . . and Uber Technologies, Inc. . . . filed a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction requesting that the Court enjoin the enforcement against
Plaintiffs . . . of any provision of California Assembly Bill 5 . . . .”); Cal.
Trucking Ass’n v. Becerra, 433 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1160 (S.D. Cal. 2020)
(granting a preliminary injunction against enforcement of AB 5 with respect
to certain truckers). For a sense of the degree to which the media and the
public actively followed these cases, see, for example, Sebastian Herrera & Tim
Higgins, California Sues Uber, Lyft Saying They Misclassified Drivers as
Independent Contractors, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2020, 4:10 PM),
https://perma.cc/2JFS-6BHZ (“California sued Uber Technologies Inc. and Lyft
Inc. for allegedly misclassifying their drivers as independent contractors
instead of employees, a move that intensifies a battle between the ride-hailing
giants and their home state.”); Uber and Lyft Must Comply with Labor Law
AB 5, Appeals Court Orders, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020, 7:50 PM),
https://perma.cc/8M4R-ZUX7 (“Uber and Lyft . . . appealed an August
preliminary injunction by a San Francisco judge.”).
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completely in the state.30 Although no shutdowns occurred,31
hostility toward AB 5 remained, and in November 2020
Californians passed a referendum ballot measure—Proposition
22—exempting Uber, Lyft, and similar companies entirely from
treatment under the bill.32
Given the salience and rapid growth of the gig economy, it
has received substantial treatment among legal scholars,
particularly in light of assertions by companies that gig economy
workers are independent contractors and not employees.33 To
date, much of the scholarly literature has focused on the
question of which category gig workers properly belong to.34
Some have suggested that the existence of such employment
arrangements necessitates the creation of a new classification.35
30. See Preetika Rana, Uber and Lyft Threaten California Shutdown:
Here’s What’s at Stake, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2020, 2:55 PM),
https://perma.cc/4VZC-9C5F (“Uber Chief Executive Dara Khosrowshahi and
Lyft President John Zimmer have said they would rather suspend operations
in the state than upend their businesses overnight.”).
31. See Sara Ashley O’Brien, Uber and Lyft Get Reprieve from Court,
Won’t Shut Down in California for Now, CNN (Aug. 20, 2020, 4:35 PM),
https://perma.cc/8NSS-7DWA (“Uber . . . and Lyft . . . narrowly avoided
shutting down their ride-hailing services in California after an appellate court
granted the companies a temporary reprieve . . . . ”).
32. See Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Drivers in California Will Remain
Contractors, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/HT4B-C5BJ
(“California voters carried Uber and Lyft to victory, overwhelmingly approving
Proposition 22, a ballot measure that allows gig economy companies to
continue treating driver as independent contractors.”).
33. A Westlaw search for Uber and “independent contractor” yields 1,802
combined total results in the “Law Reviews & Journals,” “Legal Newspapers
& Newsletters,” and “Texts & Treatises” categories as of March 20, 2022.
34. See, e.g., Ben Z. Steinberger, Note, Redefining ‘Employee’ in the Gig
Economy: Shielding Workers from the Uber Model, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 577, 590 (2018) (articulating a new five-factor employee classification test
with the goal of classifying Uber drivers as employees); Sprague, supra note 9,
at 54 (“Thus, if companies in the sharing economy depend on service providers
for the company’s existence, the service providers should be considered their
employees.”); Benjamin Powell, Identity Crisis: The Misclassification of
California Uber Drivers, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 459, 463 (2017) (“Based on the
applicable rules, tests, and case law that have developed in California over the
last several generations, Uber drivers are most properly classified as
employees . . . .”).
35. See, e.g., Michael L. Nadler, Independent Employees: A New Category
of Workers for the Gig Economy, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 443, 447 (2018) (“This
Article is the first to engage with the existing worker-misclassification
case-law to outline a new category, the ‘independent employee’ . . . .”); Andre
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Others have argued that any statutory conferral of benefits and
protections based on employment classification status is
inherently flawed.36 While some have addressed the legal
sufficiency of other jurisdictions’ related attempts to modernize
labor laws in response to the rise of the gig economy,37 almost
none have commented directly on AB 5 or its merits as
employment law reform.38

Andoyan, Comment, Independent Contractor or Employee: I’m Uber Confused!
Why California Should Create an Exception for Uber Drivers and the
“On-Demand Economy”, 44 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 153, 168 (2017) (proposing
a hybrid classification for gig economy workers); Andrew G. Malik, Note,
Worker Classification and the Gig-Economy, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1729, 1732
(2017) (“Ultimately, this Note concludes that the current dichotomy . . . is no
longer sufficient and should be reformed or adapted to meet the unique needs
of the gig-economy.”); Carl Shaffer, Note, Square Pegs Do Not Fit in Round
Holes: The Case for a Third Worker Classification for the Sharing Economy
and Transportation Network Company Drivers, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 1031, 1059
(2017) (suggesting the creation of a third category of worker called the
“platform contractor,” who would be entitled to minimum wage, liability
insurance for actions performed in furtherance of the parties’ mutual business
objectives, and minimal control from the hiring platform entity); Megan
Carboni, Comment, A New Class of Worker for the Sharing Economy, 22 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 16 (2016) (“This comment proposes a third legislative category
of worker under the Fair Labor Standards Act—the ‘dependent
contractor’ . . . .”).
36. See Ethan Rubin, Note, Independent Contractors or Employees? Why
Mediation Should Be Utilized by Uber and Its Drivers to Solve the Mystery of
How to Define Working Individuals in a Sharing Economy Business Model, 19
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 163, 165 (2017) (arguing that dispute resolution
under principles of equity is a better solution to the Uber
employee-independent contractor conundrum); Richard R. Carlson, Why the
Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop
Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 301 (2001) (“This article proposes
an approach to statutory coverage based on the character of the transactions
between the parties instead of the status of the parties.”).
37. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Employed by an Algorithm: Labor
Rights in the On-Demand Economy, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 987, 988 (2017)
(“This Article . . . provides an in-depth analysis of the federal preemption and
antitrust issues raised by collective bargaining laws like Seattle’s in order to
determine whether state and local attempts to regulate working conditions in
the on-demand economy may survive legal challenge.”).
38. See Abigail S. Rosenfeld, Comment, ABC to AB 5: The Supreme Court
of California Modernizes Common Law Doctrine in Dynamex Operations West,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 61 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT II.-112, II.-114 (2020)
(addressing the passage of AB 5 only to acknowledge that it passed and that
its scope and effects are still uncertain).
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This Note contributes to existing gig economy and
employment law scholarship in two ways. First, it serves to
update the literature in light of AB 5’s recent developments.
Second, this Note argues that it is clear in hindsight that AB 5
was ill-equipped to accomplish its desired outcomes from the
outset. The bill had a tenuous footing in the California case law
it purported to codify, ignored broader calls for employee
classification reform, and did not adequately consider
detrimental unintended effects. Perhaps most shockingly,
nearly three years after its passage, the fate of AB 5’s
applicability to a major sector of the economy it sought to
regulate remains in flux: as of the time of writing, a state
constitutional challenge to Proposition 22 is currently pending
on appeal before a California appellate court.39
Part I contextualizes the problem AB 5 sought to solve by
looking to the historical purpose of the distinction between
employees and independent contractors in American
employment law. It accounts for twenty-first century
developments in the nature of employment relationships and
gives voice to those who have called for responsive reform. Part
II describes what AB 5 purported to do, with consideration for
the concerns that gave rise to the bill, the circumstances of its
passage, its substance, and the scope of its reach. Part III
evaluates the effectiveness of AB 5 as a means of reform in light
of relevant California case law, the relative merits of the
employee classification standards it codifies, and the
unintentional consequences of its unique formulation. This Note
concludes by asserting that the statutory employee
classification scheme California implemented in AB 5 should not
be a model for other states eager to modernize their employment
law.

39. See Maeve Allsup, Prop. 22 Backers Appeal Ruling Striking
California Gig Work Law (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 22, 2021, 7:57 PM),
https://perma.cc/6H25-DJF6 (noting that both the California Department of
Justice and a private coalition of Proposition 22 supporters filed a notice of
appeal from a lower court order that ruled Proposition 22 unconstitutional).
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THE TRICKY BUSINESS OF EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION
A.

What Is Employee Misclassification?

The law of agency in the United States recognizes two
categories of workers: employees and independent contractors.40
The distinction carries two significant implications. First,
statutory schemes require employers to provide certain benefits
and protections to individuals classified as employees.41 Second,
employers can face vicarious liability for the conduct of their
employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior.42 By
contrast, neither benefits nor vicarious liability apply in the
context of individuals classified as independent contractors.43
Thus, which of the two categories an individual providing a paid
service belongs to is an important and often difficult question
for
employers,
workers,
legislatures,
and
courts.44
Unfortunately, both terms are poorly defined.45
Because companies seeking to make a profit generally try
to minimize costs,46 there are circumstances under which

40. See Jennifer Pinsof, Note, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee
Misclassification in the Modern Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 341, 345 (2016) (“Today, America’s binary classification system sorts
workers into two categories: employee or independent contractor.”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 202 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1958)
(distinguishing
between
servants—today
more
naturally
called
employees— and independent contractors).
41. See Pinsof, supra note 40, at 367 (“[A] presumption of employee status
would, in aggregate, increase the number of workers covered by labor and
employment statutes.”).
42. See id. at 347–48 (stating that the earliest employee classification test
developed to resolve liability disputes between workers and employers).
43. See John A. Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, The Future of Independent
Contractors and Their Status as Non-Employees: Moving on from a Common
Law Standard, 14 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 9–10 (2018) (discussing the different
treatment of employees versus independent contractors in the contexts of
vicarious employer liability and statutory protective schemes); Pinsof, supra
note 40, 348–49 (2016) (same).
44. See Pinsof, supra note 40, at 350 (describing the importance and
difficulty of determining employee classification to courts, government
agencies, state legislatures, juries, employers, and workers alike).
45. See id. at 345–46 (discussing the lack of clear definitions with respect
to the terms “employee” and “independent contractor”).
46. See id. at 351–52 (“Misclassification is often motivated by incentives
to minimize the cost of labor and limit employer liability.”).
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employers would prefer to engage an independent contractor
rather than a true employee.47 Such a company may avoid the
costs associated with employment taxes, health insurance,
retirement plans, workers’ compensation, overtime, and
litigating employment discrimination and vicarious liability
claims, among others.48 In engaging a worker to provide a paid
service, an employing entity must determine at the outset of the
engagement whether to classify that worker as an
employee—and accordingly provide that worker with all
benefits and protections guaranteed by relevant statutes—or as
an independent contractor.49 Unsurprisingly, such a
determination by an employing entity is not the final word.
The problem of “employee misclassification” arises when a
worker asserts she has been denied benefits and protections due
to her because her employing entity wrongfully considered her
an independent contractor.50 Because this question usually
involves statutory and case law interpretation, employee
misclassification questions commonly result in litigation and
are answered by courts on a largely individualized basis.51 To
the extent legislatures may be concerned about whether there is
systemic misclassification within their jurisdictions, the
immense variety of employment relationships complicates their

47. See id. at 352 (“[I]ndependent contractors are estimated to cost
twenty to thirty percent less per worker.”).
48. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 43, at 2–3 (describing employers’
economic motivations for classifying workers as independent contractors);
Pinsof, supra note 40, at 352 (same).
49. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 43, at 3 (“The applicable legal
rules . . . make it difficult for businesses and workers to assess whether a
worker is an independent contractor or an employee.”).
50. See Pinsof, supra note 40, at 349 (“Misclassification, or the improper
classification of workers as independent contractors instead of employees,
greatly contributes to the growing number of people identified as independent
contractors today . . . .” (emphasis added)). In theory, misclassification might
arise in the converse context of a worker asserting that she has been
wrongfully labeled an employee when she is in fact an independent contractor.
But that is not how the term is typically understood, and such a situation
would not be representative of the term’s use. See id. at 368 (describing
workers being misclassified as employees as “a much rarer occurrence”).
51. See id. at 368 (“[I]f and when a worker is able to recognize his own
misclassification, going to court is often the only way to establish employee
status and eligibility for legal protections.”).
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inquiry.52 A court’s ascertainment of a worker’s status is a
fact-intensive analysis that generally does not produce broadly
applicable principles that can form the basis for an accounting
of how many other workers might similarly be misclassified.53
As a result, a particular worker’s status is typically only known
once that worker has raised a legal challenge and a court has
ruled on the issue.54
Courts have developed a wide array of confusing and
ambiguous tests to answer the employee classification
question.55 These include the traditional common law control
test, the economic realities test, the Internal Revenue Service
twenty-factor test, and the ABC Test, among others.56 A full
understanding of the reason for the proliferation of such tests
requires examination of the historical origins and subsequent
development of the employee-independent contractor
dichotomy.
B.

Historical Origins

The employee-independent contractor distinction is rooted
in early common law cases involving workplace injury liability.57

52. See, e.g., ANNETTE BERNHARDT & SARAH THOMASON, U.C. BERKELEY
CTR. FOR LAB. RSCH. & EDUC., WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT GIG WORK IN
CALIFORNIA?: AN ANALYSIS OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTING 10 (2017),
https://perma.cc/D5UB-UNKT (PDF) (noting the numerous challenges
associated with counting independent contractors at the state level).
53. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 43, at 3 (“Contemporary legal
challenges have not led to a published judicial opinion that provides a
conclusive answer to the question of whether gig-workers are independent
contractors or not.”); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1146
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that employee classification is a mixed question of law
and fact).
54. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 43, at 3 (“[T]hese cases have either
settled or been left for juries to decide, leaving workers, businesses, judges,
and scholars insisting on legal reform that provides a bright line distinction
between an independent contractor and an employee.”); supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
55. See Pinsof, supra note 40, at 349 (“The confusing, ambiguous legal
tests for employment classification lead employers to misclassify workers both
intentionally and unintentionally.”).
56. See id. at 349–50 (listing commonly applied employee classification
tests).
57. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399,
403 (Cal. 1989) (“The distinction between independent contractors and

912

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899 (2022)

The doctrine of respondeat superior—which holds employers
liable for the negligence of their employees acting within the
scope of their employment58—required courts in these cases to
distinguish between employees and independent contractors
because an employer would not face similar liability for the
conduct of an independent contractor.59
The test courts developed at common law to address this
liability question hinged on whether the hiring entity exercised
control over the details of the work as opposed to merely its
outcome.60 That test is “remarkably unchanged from its original
formulation, despite the fact employment relationships have
evolved dramatically since the rule’s inception.”61
However, control was never the exclusive test in respondeat
superior determinations.62 Before the end of the nineteenth
century, courts also considered other factors to “take account of
the reality and variability of working relationships.”63 While
employees arose at common law to limit one’s vicarious liability for the
misconduct of a person rendering service to him.”); Pinsof, supra note 40, at
344–45 (observing that, even before the Industrial Revolution, the
“master-servant” relationship required clear delineation for the determination
of rights and responsibilities such as rate of payment, grounds for termination,
and the question of a master’s vicarious liability); Rosenfeld, supra note 38, at
II.-112, II.-115–II.-116 (“Prior to the close of the nineteenth century, litigation
concerning worker classification primarily concerned whether employers could
be held liable for damages resulting from workplace accidents.”); see also, e.g.,
Sproul v. Hemmingway, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 1, 3 (1833) (addressing the
meaning of “servant” to establish whether a steamboat’s operator and crew
could be liable for damage they negligently caused to an anchored schooner).
58. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 43, at 2–3 (noting that the doctrine of
respondeat superior renders employers liable for damages their employees
incur during the scope of their employment).
59. See Pinsof, supra note 40, at 347 (discussing the origins of the
common law control test).
60. See id. at 348 (“Considering its origin, the test’s focus on control
makes perfect sense; to determine whether an employer was liable for the torts
of a worker, we would want to know how much control the employer asserted
over the working conditions of the employee.”).
61. Id.
62. See Carlson, supra note 36, at 310 (“[B]y the end of the nineteenth
century the courts had already identified and assembled most of the other
basic ‘factors’ recognized today as evidencing one or the other type of worker
status.”).
63. Id.; see id. at 310–11 (“These included the manner of
compensation, . . . the exclusivity of the relationship . . . , the worker’s control
over starting and quitting time, relative contributions of equipment and

CALIFORNIA EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION

913

consideration of additional factors may have allowed courts
greater flexibility, it also “compounded the uncertainty of their
tests.”64 Judicial recognition of the need to consider factors
beyond mere control began a decades-long shift away from
consistency and toward a know-it-when-we-see-it approach.65
C.

Post-Industrial Revolution Developments

In the twentieth century, the employee-independent
contractor distinction took on greater meaning in the context of
New Deal legislation, which created new protections and
benefits for employees, but not independent contractors,66 and
in turn raised the stakes in employee classification litigation.67
No longer were employee classification disputes restricted
merely to a determination of a hiring entity’s vicarious
liability—the category now included suits by workers asserting
individual entitlements.68 This development further strained
the existing common law test because courts faced with such
weighty subject matter continued to turn to an increasing
number of factors to guide their decisions.69
In the twenty-first century, technological advancement has
meaningfully altered the nature of work and employment

resources for the work, . . . and a comparison of the employer’s general
treatment of the worker in comparison with other workers who were
apparently regular employees.”).
64. Id. at 310.
65. See id. (arguing that early deviation from the strict common law
control test left courts hoping to know the difference between independent
contractors and employees on a largely ad hoc basis).
66. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–168 (1935)
(protecting workers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively); Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (1938) (mandating a minimum wage and
requiring increased payment for overtime hours).
67. See Pinsof, supra note 40, at 348 (“[T]oday many worker benefits and
protections hinge on employment status.”).
68. Id.
69. See Carlson, supra note 62, at 311 (“[W]hile control over work was a
basic premise of respondeat superior, it competed with an increasing number
of other factors when the courts turned to the question of coverage under social
welfare and protective legislation.”); Rosenfeld, supra note 38, at II.-118–19
(arguing that the advent of statutory employee protections and benefits was a
motivating factor behind the California Supreme Court’s decision to alter the
common law test).
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relationships.70 Employee misclassification has become a
particularly contentious issue in light of the rise of the so-called
“gig economy.”71 The gig economy, also variously termed the
sharing economy or the on-demand business model,
encompasses “peer-to-peer transactions” such as those through
Airbnb that connect property owners with short-term renters,
as well as “businesses conducting operations through the use of
short-term,
task-oriented
employment
facilitated
by
technology,” such as Lyft, Uber, and TaskRabbit.72 Companies
in this space commonly position themselves as middlemen or
“platforms,” connecting buyers and sellers on two sides of a
digital marketplace.73 Such arrangements are unique because
gig economy workers—the “sellers” of the online platform
marketplace—often look like both employees and independent
contractors in crucial ways.74
On the one hand, gig economy workers operate with a
degree of flexibility employees do not traditionally have.75
However, as Richard Carlson has observed, gig economy
platform companies can also “exert powerful influences over
70. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (noting that Uber’s novel sharing economy business model created
significant challenges for applying the common law test and suggesting the
need for reform); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87,
94 (discussing the challenges the platform economy presents to existing
employment law); Pinsof, supra note 40, at 348–49 (“While the common law
control test and the employee/contractor distinction may have been adequate
to define the scope of labor laws in the twentieth century, they cannot be so
easily adapted to twenty-first century employment relationships.”).
71. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 43, at 20 (“The complexity of the legal
[employee classification] tests and their shortcomings are even more apparent
when applying them in the context of the modern gig economy.”); id. at 21
(“[T]he gig economy grew ten-fold from 2012 to 2015.”).
72. Id. at 20–21; see also The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST
(Mar. 9, 2013), https://perma.cc/T7FC-Q27U (articulating the scope of the
gig—or “sharing”—economy).
73. See Lobel, supra note 70, at 94 (“[A] platform company is launched as
an online intermediary between buyers and sellers of goods and services—the
ancient role of the middleman—enhanced with [] modern [technology].”).
74. See Carlson, supra note 62, at 300 (“In reality, independent
contractors frequently resemble employees in ways that make them equally in
need of protection [as employees].”).
75. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 43, at 22 (“For example, one Uber
driver may occasionally drive a couple hours a week, while another may
regularly spend 40 or more hours working for Uber.”).
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working conditions, including the setting of non-negotiable wage
rates and strict behavior codes, while maintaining the ability to
hire and fire workers in ways that are reflective of traditional
employer-employee relationships.”76 As such, the rise of the gig
economy has resulted in a number of misclassification lawsuits
by gig workers against gig companies,77 all of which pit “20th
century [employee classification] tests” against “a 21st century
problem.”78
D.

Uber as a Gig Economy Case Study

Uber presents a helpful example of the challenges gig
economy apps pose to traditional conceptions of the
employee-independent contractor dichotomy. What started as
an idea born of two travelers’ 2008 lamentations that rides in
Paris are difficult to come by on snowy nights79 is today a global
leader in on-demand transportation, a household name, a verb
that defines its sector,80 and a ticker on the New York Stock

76. Carlson, supra note 62, at 300.
77. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (involving allegations by plaintiff Uber drivers that they had
been misclassified as independent contractors); Search v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
128 F. Supp. 3d 222, 226 (D.D.C. 2015) (involving a vicarious liability claim
against Uber by a passenger for negligent hiring, training, and supervision);
In re Uber Techs., Inc., Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs., 158 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1372
(J.P.M.L. 2016) (“This litigation arises from the allegation that defendant[]
Uber Technologies, Inc. . . . misclassif[ies] Uber transportation providers as
independent contractors instead of employees, fail[s] to provide
reimbursement of necessary business expenses, and withhold[s] gratuities.”);
Lavitman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. SUCV201204490, 2015 WL 728187, at *1
(Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2015) (involving an allegation by driver plaintiffs
that Uber improperly retained a portion of the 20 percent fee it charges each
rider in addition to that rider’s fare); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067,
1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The question in this case is whether Lyft drivers are
‘employees’ or ‘independent contractors’ under California law.”).
78. Pearce & Silva, supra note 43, at 22.
79. See The History of Uber, UBER TECHS., INC., https://perma.cc/4MHZXSDN (“On a cold winter evening in Paris, Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp
couldn’t get a ride. That’s when the idea for Uber was born.”).
80. See, e.g., Evie Nagy, Uber Is a Verb: How a Brand Becomes a
Verb— and Why It’s Significant (Sept. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/47J8-QHEX
(“As for Uber, it has become the default action word for technology-facilitated,
on-demand transportation.”).
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Exchange boasting a valuation of nearly $70 billion.81 Given
Uber’s ubiquitous global presence, readers are likely to be
familiar with its business model generally. However, assuming
far fewer readers have used the Uber app to transport
passengers and earn income, a basic summary of the driver
experience is in order.
An individual who wishes to use the Uber app as a driver
begins by creating a driver profile online.82 This process entails
the submission of documents including a valid driver’s license,
vehicle registration, personal insurance, and a driver photo.83
Uber contracts with third party companies who then conduct a
background check on the individual seeking to drive.84 Once
approved, a driver may open the Uber Driver app at any time
and indicate that they are actively willing to accept passenger
trip requests.85 When a passenger indicates through their Uber
app that they wish to receive a ride, Uber’s matching algorithm
sends the request to a nearby active driver, who then has an
opportunity to accept or reject the request.86 After accepting a
request, the driver picks up the rider and drives them to their
destination.87 The fare for a particular ride is based on the time
and distance of the trip, as well as the relative balance of riders
and available drivers at the time of the request.88 Drivers
receive a portion of the fare the rider pays—a transaction Uber
facilitates—according to the terms of the service agreement

81. See NYSE: UBER, GOOGLE FIN. (Mar. 30, 2022, 10:13 AM),
https://perma.cc/ETC7-KQFV (showing a total market capitalization of $67.96
billion).
82. See Driver: Requirements, UBER TECHS., INC., https://perma.cc/R7QNAFUU (detailing the signup process).
83. See id. (listing the documents required for signup).
84. See id. (indicating that after signing up, a screening process will
review the driver’s driving record and criminal history).
85. See UBER TECHS., INC., THE ROAD TO SUCCESS IS FULL OF AMBITIOUS
DRIVERS LIKE YOU, ______ 33 (2020), https://perma.cc/BW3B-VGXT (PDF)
(“Once you’re online, the app will start connecting you with nearby trip
requests that’ll appear on your app screen.”).
86. See id. (“If you tap Accept on a request . . . .” (emphasis added)).
87. See id. (“[Y]ou’ll see an optional route to your rider’s pickup
location.”).
88. See id. (“Your trip earnings are calculated based on the time and
distance driven and can also include base fares, surge pricing, promotions,
wait time, and additional fees.”).
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drivers acknowledge before they can use the app.89 After each
trip, riders and drivers are asked to rate each other on a scale of
one to five stars.90 A rider or driver with a meaningful number
of bad ratings may have their access to the app revoked.91 A
driver may refuse any particular ride request, and may log off
the app at any time and for any duration of time without
penalty.92
Does this look like a conventional employment
arrangement? On the one hand, Uber contends it “exercises
minimal control over how its transportation providers actually
provide transportation services to Uber customers.”93 Drivers
decide when, where, and for how long they work, and have no
direct supervision in the ordinary sense of the term.94 Moreover,
drivers supply their own vehicles and smartphones.95 On the
other hand, Uber—not drivers—sets the rates for trips
conducted via its app.96 Uber’s algorithm also determines when
and where rates should elevate in an attempt to better match
the supply of drivers to the demand for rides (so-called “surge

89. See McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 222 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (“A prospective Uber driver must agree to the terms and
conditions of Uber’s ‘Software Sublicense and Online Agreement.’”).
90. See Drive: Safety, UBER TECHS., INC., https://perma.cc/5TKT-V47P
(characterizing the two-way rating system as a safety measure).
91. See id. (indicating that low-rated trips are logged and that users may
be removed to protect the Uber community).
92. See Drive: Driving Basics, UBER TECHS., INC., https://perma.cc/ZDE83MX8 (“If a trip . . . is farther than you want to drive, you can always
decline.”); id. (“Just tap Go Offline on the map when you don’t want to get ride
requests anymore.”).
93. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal.
2015).
94. See id. (“[D]rivers set their own hours and work schedules, . . . and
are subject to little direct supervision.”).
95. See id. (“[D]rivers . . . provide their own vehicles . . . .”). Citing the
then-active Uber Transportation Provider Service Agreement, the O’Connor
court did note that the plaintiff drivers used smartphones Uber provided. See
id. at 1153 (“Uber supplies the critical tool of the business—smart phone with
the Uber application.”). This was an early practice of Uber’s that no longer
exists. See, e.g., Uber Technologies, Inc., Platform Access Agreement (Jan. 6,
2020) (PDF) (on file with author) (containing no reference to Uber’s provision
of smartphones to drivers).
96. See O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142 (“Uber sets the fares it charges
riders unilaterally.”).
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pricing”),97 and in some sense can be said to choose which of any
number of online drivers receives a particular trip request.98
Courts have noted that Uber “could no[t] survive without
[drivers],”99 which, under certain employee classification tests
would weigh in favor of employee status.100 Courts have also
characterized Uber’s driver signup process as “exercis[ing]
substantial control over the qualification and selection of its
drivers.”101 At least one court has construed Uber’s five-star
driver rating system as a form of monitoring or supervision by
the company, since Uber sometimes disables the accounts of
drivers whose average ratings drop below a defined threshold.102
With so many factors pulling in opposite directions, it is
simply not obvious whether Uber drivers are employees or
independent contractors. In fact, the court in O’Connor v. Uber
Technologies, Inc.103 ultimately denied Uber’s motion for
summary judgment on the question in favor of allowing a jury
to decide.104 Of course, Uber is not the only gig economy company
whose technology-based business model challenges existing
legal standards for employee classification.105 However, it is

97. See Anubhav Pattnaik, How Does Uber Do Surge Pricing Using
Location Data?, LOCALE.AI (Jan. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/XGR3-8ANN
(“Surge Pricing is an algorithmically fuelled [sic] technique that Uber (and
now a lot of other on-demand companies) use when there is a demand-supply
imbalance.”).
98. See O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142 (noting that Uber prohibits
drivers from arranging pickups with passengers outside the app).
99. Id. at 1144.
100. See id. at 1153 (suggesting that a test that takes account of “economic
realities” might be a better analytical tool for classifying Uber drivers than the
California test the court was bound to apply).
101. Id. at 1142.
102. See id. at 1143 (“Uber documents further reveal that Uber regularly
terminates the accounts of drivers who do not perform up to Uber’s
standards.”).
103. 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
104. See id. at 1153 (“[T]he [applicable California] test does not yield an
unambiguous result. The matter cannot on this record be decided as a matter
of law. Uber’s motion for summary judgment is therefore denied.”).
105. See Lobel, supra note 70, at 94 (enumerating other gig economy or
“platform” companies including Amazon).
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certainly one of the most recognizable,106 and the lines it blurs
are representative of the gig economy as a whole.
E.

Calls for Reform

Twentieth century statutory employee protection schemes
and twenty-first century revolutions in the ways people work
have resulted in the proliferation of multifactor employee
classification tests applied differently across jurisdictions—and
even within jurisdictions for different purposes.107 Scholars and
courts alike have long lamented that the inconsistent
application of such tests across and within jurisdictions has
generated a labyrinthine body of law in need of reform.108
Meanwhile, reformers have largely focused on reducing the
confusion and ambiguity inherent in the nature of multifactor
balancing tests and on combating employers’ economic
motivations to misclassify workers as independent contractors
to avoid associated costs.109 Other reformers have even
suggested that the law abandon altogether its attempts to
articulate a precise standard for employee classification based
on status in light of the complexity and variability of personal
services relationships and the difficulties inherent in strictly
categorizing employees and independent contractors when the
lines between them are so often blurry.110 Accordingly, it is not

106. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 43, at 25 (labeling Uber the biggest
and one of the more influential companies in the gig economy with 160,000
U.S. drivers as of 2016); Kennedy, supra note 37, at 989 (stating the Uber is
the undisputed leader of the on-demand economy).
107. See Pinsof, supra note 40, at 348 n.39 (“The most common legal tests
used to determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor
include the common law right to control test, the economic realities test, the
Internal Revenue Service twenty-factor test, and the ABC Test.”).
108. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (“Few
problems in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in
results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an
employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent,
entrepreneurial dealing.”); Pinsof, supra note 40, at 347–50 (arguing that the
large number of different classification tests and factors has resulted in
confusion and necessitates reform).
109. See, e.g., Pinsof, supra note 40, at 349 (“Two related factors drive
[worker misclassification]: ambiguity in the law and employers’ economic
motivations.”).
110. Carlson, supra note 62, at 301.
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surprising that the California state legislature acted in 2019 in
an attempt to modernize its employee classification law. What
is surprising, however, is the way in which it did so.
II.
A.

CALIFORNIA AB 5

What Is California AB 5?

In 2019, amidst growing pleas from groups of ridesharing
drivers and related media reports,111 the California State
Legislature passed AB 5 in an effort to redress what it
characterized as the harms resulting from employee
misclassification in the state generally: loss of significant
workplace protections and benefits for workers, unfairness to
employers who must compete with companies that misclassify,
loss to the state of needed revenue from companies that use
misclassification to avoid tax obligations, erosion of the middle
class, and a rise in income inequality.112
AB 5 split California’s labor economy into two groups, each
of which it subjects to a different employee classification test.
Purporting to follow the California Supreme Court’s approach
in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, AB 5 requires by default that “any person
providing labor or services for remuneration shall be considered
an employee rather than an independent contractor”113 unless
the hiring entity demonstrates three conditions under the
so-called “ABC Test”: (A) the person is free from the control and
direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance
of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the
work and in fact; (B) the person performs work that is outside
the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) the
person is customarily engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that
involved in the work performed.114

111. See, e.g., Siddiqui, California Senate, supra note 28.
112. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 1(b)–(e), California 2019–20 Regular
Session (Cal. 2019) (listing the purposes of the bill).
113. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 2(a)(1).
114. See id. (articulating the elements of the ABC Test).
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Under AB 5, some categories of workers are exempt from
the ABC Test.115 Courts assess the employment status of
workers in those categories under the control-of-work test
articulated in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of
Industrial Relations.116 These categories include those licensed
by the Department of Insurance, various medical professionals,
securities brokers, investment advisors, direct salespersons,
commercial fishermen, and professional service providers who
meet several additional criteria.117 The Borello test requires
courts to consider first whether an employing entity “has all
necessary control over the manner and means of accomplishing
the result desired,” regardless of whether that control is direct
or indirect and whether the entity actually exercised it.118
That factor alone is not dispositive, however, and courts
must further consider a multitude of other factors, including:
whether the worker performing services holds themselves out as
being engaged in an occupation of business distinct from the
employer, whether the work is a regular or integral part of the
employer’s business, and whether the employer or the worker
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place for the
worker doing the work.119

115. See id. § 2(b) (“Subdivision (a) and the holding in [Dynamex] . . . do
not apply to the following occupations as defined in the paragraphs
below . . . .”).
116. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 2(b) (“[D]etermination of employee or
independent contractor status for individuals in [excepted] occupations shall
be governed by Borello.”).
117. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 2(b) (listing exceptions).
118. See Independent Contractor Versus Employee, ST. OF CAL. DEP’T OF
INDUS. RELS. (2021), https://perma.cc/W3W2-VAHS (laying out the
department’s interpretation of the Borello factors).
119. Id.; see also S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d
399, 404–07 (Cal. 1989) (discussing the factors that courts may consider in
addition to control-of-work). In addition to these factors, courts consider:
whether the worker has invested in the business, such as in the equipment or
materials required by their task; whether the service provided requires a
special skill; the kind of occupation, and whether the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; the
worker’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on their managerial skill; the
length of time for which the services are to be performed; the degree of
permanence of the working relationship; the method of payment, whether by
time or by the job; whether the worker hires their own employees; whether the
employer has a right to fire at will or whether a termination gives rise to an
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The speed with which the bill passed through both houses
of the California state legislature is notable. Only nine months
expired between its introduction in December 2018 and its
signing by the governor in September 2019.120 During that time,
AB 5 underwent significant change: the vast majority of the
bill’s final text—including all of the excepted occupations it
ultimately recognized—came into being via amendments to the
originally introduced version.121 The only operative clause in the
short original version of the bill expressed an intent to codify
and clarify the application of the Dynamex decision in California
law.122 That is to say, the bifurcated approach to employee
classification that AB 5 now embodies appears to have been the
result of legislative compromises over the course of a handful of
months, as opposed to a scheme the bill’s author expressly
envisioned. Nevertheless, AB 5’s sponsor Lorena Gonzales
declared upon the bill’s passage that “California is now setting
the global standard for worker protections for other states and
countries to follow.”123 However, the compromises to which AB 5
ultimately acceded would have profound consequences with
respect to AB 5’s scope and effectiveness as a reform measure.

action for breach of contract; and whether the worker and the potential
employer believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship. See id.
120. See AB-5 Worker Status: Employees and Independent Contractors:
Bill History, CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/CH5A-F3RY
(indicating that the bill was introduced in December 2018 and approved by
Governor Gavin Newsome in September 2019).
121. Compare Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5, California 2019–2020 Regular
Session (Cal. 2019) (introduced) (containing no exceptions), with Cal. Assemb
B. No. 5, California 2019–2020 Regular Session (Cal. 2019) (chaptered)
(containing numerous exceptions). The California state legislature provides an
online tool for ease of comparison at https://perma.cc/N3NA-HNAQ.
122. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 2(a), California 2019–2020 Regular
Session (Cal. 2019) (introduced) (“It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting
this act to include provisions that would codify the decision of the California
Supreme Court in Dynamex and would clarify the decision’s application in
state law.”).
123. Governor Signs Lorena Gonzalez’s AB 5 to Stop Misclassification and
Protect Millions of Workers, ASSEMB. WOMAN LORENA GONZALEZ (Sept. 18,
2019), https://perma.cc/KGL4-PKWN [hereinafter Gonzalez Statement].
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How Much of the Economy Does AB 5 Cover?

One of the California legislature’s motivations for enacting
AB 5 was to “restore[] . . . important protections to potentially
several million workers who have been denied . . . basic
workplace rights that all employees are entitled to under the
including
“minimum
wage,
workers’
law,”124
compensation . . . unemployment insurance, paid sick leave,
and paid family leave.”125 As such, achieving some sense of the
scale of the state’s independent contractor economy—as well as
the scope of the bill’s coverage of that category of individuals—is
instructive in assessing AB 5’s potential to effect its purported
goal.
The U.C. Berkeley Labor Center estimated in 2017 that
approximately 8.5 percent of California workers were
independent contractors.126 There is considerable uncertainty as
to whether that percentage is growing, and trend data for
California specifically are not available.127 The Berkeley
analysis highlighted several difficulties associated with
counting independent contractors.128 First, the field is replete
with inconsistent definitions. Due to the popularity of so-called
“labor platform” apps like Uber, Lyft, and TaskRabbit, many
recent studies have focused only on trying to count these apps’
users while overlooking more traditional independent
contractors.129 Accordingly, the possibility arises that counts
reporting large and increasing numbers of independent
contractors may simply be indexing the rapid growth in

124. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 1(e).
125. Id.
126. BERNHARDT & THOMASON, supra note 52, at 7.
127. See Brett Collins et al., Is Gig Work Replacing Traditional
Employment? Evidence from Two Decades of Tax Returns, IRS (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://perma.cc/2JKT-HDZ5 (PDF) (finding some increase in independent
work since 2007 nationally but questioning whether the increase is due to
online platform economy jobs supplanting traditional full-time work).
128. See BERNHARDT & THOMASON, supra note 52, at 4 (discussing
challenges in the study’s methodology).
129. See id. (“There is currently no consensus definition of the term ‘gig
work’ . . . the singular focus on Uber is impeding our ability to get an accurate
understanding of what has (and has not) changed in the workplace . . . .”).
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popularity of such apps.130 Whether this constitutes an employee
misclassification problem is then a matter of perspective: if one
starts from the premise that companies who engage app-based
workers should classify those workers as employees rather than
independent contractors, and if they currently do not, one finds
rampant misclassification. However, if one sees the
phenomenon of app-based work as necessitating an overhaul of
the ancient employee-independent contractor dichotomy,131 then
a count of independent contractors that includes large numbers
of app-based workers obscures any underlying misclassification
problem that may or may not exist among more traditional
occupations.
A second methodological challenge to counting independent
contractors is the lack of reliable state-level data.132 A separate
2015 joint report by the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics and the Government Accountability Office estimated
that approximately 12.9 percent of the United States workforce
were then classified as independent contractors—representing
nearly a twofold increase from 2005.133 However, the Berkeley
study was unable to verify the same trend at the California state
level.134
Third, the Berkeley study’s authors highlighted a tendency
of independent contractors to take on independent work as
supplemental to a primary source of income, making it difficult
to determine precisely who should factor into a count of
independent contractors.135 This has an important bearing on

130. See id. at 6 (“Our definition [of gig work] encompasses—but is broader
than—the on-demand platform work that is often the focus of gig economy
debates.”).
131. See Jennifer Pinsof, supra note 40, at 344–45 (“For over 100 years,
America has classified workers into these two categories, yet the law
continuously fails to do so in a uniform, predictable, and purposeful way.”).
132. See BERNHARDT & THOMASON, supra note 52, at 10 (“To summarize,
we are not able to give a definitive answer as to whether the rate of
independent contracting has grown in California.”).
133. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-168R, CONTINGENT
WORKFORCE: SIZE, CHARACTERISTICS, EARNING, AND BENEFITS 16 (2015).
134. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
135. See BERNHARDT & THOMASON, supra note 52, at 5 (“[T]he distinction
between primary jobs and jobs that provide supplemental income becomes
critical here. In the popular press as well as some gig economy studies, the two
are often conflated . . . .”).
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whether a misclassification problem truly exists or is as bad as
raw numbers suggest.136 For example, if all Californian
independent contractor work were supplemental to a primary
job through which individuals already received employee
benefits and protections, then even widespread misclassification
would not wholly deprive anyone of all employee benefits and
protections.137
Finally, the Berkeley study pointed to a lack of reliable data
on the number of individuals engaged with labor platform apps
(e.g., Uber, Lyft, TaskRabbit), although the analysis quoted a
study that put this number at 0.5 percent of California workers
in 2016.138 Companies like Uber and Lyft generally do not report
this information consistently, which has led some to derive
estimates based on speculation and the occasional cryptic
remarks of the companies.139 The companies, for their part, have
also struggled to define a reliable standard for counting active
drivers, since the fluid nature of app-based work makes it
impossible to tell whether an individual who uses the app
infrequently has stopped driving altogether or is simply taking
time to do something else.140
Methodological challenges aside, in 2019, following passage
of AB 5, the U.C. Berkeley Labor Center published a new study
136. See id. at 6 (“If we count a W-2 worker who earns $1,500 a year in
1099 income as a gig worker, then she will be falsely counted as part of the gig
workforce that doesn’t have . . . access to workplace benefits or the safety
net— even though she in fact is fully covered . . . .”).
137. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
138. See The Online Platform Economy: Has Growth Peaked?, J.P. MORGAN
CHASE & CO. INST. (Nov. 2016), https://perma.cc/F9MA-VPTT (PDF) (finding
that 0.5 percent of American adults nationally participated in the online
platform economy in the month before publication, and assuming California
follows the national average).
139. See Rana, supra note 30 (“Uber says fewer than 2% of its more than
200,000 drivers in California use its app for 40 hours or more a week; Lyft says
86% of its more than 300,000 drivers in the state driver fewer than 20 hours a
week.”).
140. See Jonathan Cousar, How Many Uber Drivers Are There? We Dive in
to Find Out, RIDESTER (Jan. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/3Q79-Q4UZ (“The
nature of the Uber driver gig makes it extremely susceptible to driver churn,
which means [Uber] constantly need[s] to recruit drivers.”); see also Brenton
J. Malin & Curry Chandler, Free to Work Anxiously: Splintering Precarity
Among Drivers for Uber and Lyft, 10 COMMC’N, CULTURE & CRITIQUE 382,
385– 91 (2017) (detailing the broad spectrum of motivations drivers have for
using and ceasing to use the Uber and Lyft apps).
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estimating that the bill’s stricter employee classification test
will likely apply to 91 percent of independent contractors.141 In
sum, estimating the size of the problem AB 5 purports to solve
is a difficult task with uncertain results—which may be why it
hedges by referring to “potentially millions”142 of misclassified
workers—but the best available data indicate that independent
contractors make up a meaningful portion of the California labor
economy, and AB 5’s ABC Test likely applies to nearly all of
them.
III. AB 5 AS REFORM
A.

The Contours of Employee Classification in California

The California Supreme Court defined the relevant
boundaries of employee classification standards in two seminal
cases: S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial
Relations and Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court.
Close examination of these two cases—in particular of the
rationale that guided each decision—reveals some discord
between the court’s application of the ABC Test and the
California legislature’s attempt, through AB 5, to “codify the
decision of the California Supreme Court in Dynamex” and
“clarify the decision’s application in state law.”143
In Borello, cucumber growers sought mandamus review of
a Department of Industrial Relations order stating that
agricultural laborers engaged to harvest cucumbers were not
independent contractors, and accordingly, that they were not
exempt from workers’ compensation coverage.144 The California
Supreme Court upheld the order, finding that the agricultural
laborers were employees within the meaning of the Workers’

141. See Sarah Thomason et al., Estimating the Coverage of California’s
New AB 5 Law, U.C. BERKELEY CTR. FOR LAB. RSCH. & EDUC. (Nov. 2019),
https://perma.cc/6KTP-WEZN (PDF) (estimating that AB 5 will apply by
default to 64 percent of independent contractors in the state and to another 27
percent unless additional criteria are met).
142. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 1(e).
143. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 1(d).
144. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399,
401–03 (Cal. 1989) (summarizing the facts and procedural history of the case).
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Compensation Act.145 First, the court noted that the workers’
compensation
statute
plainly
excluded
“independent
contractors” and explicitly used the common law
“control-of-work” test in its definition of the term.146 However, it
acknowledged that the “control” test, “applied rigidly and in
isolation, is often of little use in evaluating the infinite variety
of service arrangements.”147 Accordingly, it determined that
even if control is the most important or significant
consideration, courts should evaluate employment status in
light of the history and remedial purpose of the relevant
statute148 and in conjunction with at least thirteen additional
factors drawn from the Restatement Second of Agency and other
jurisdictions’ jurisprudence, as may be appropriate to the
particulars of an individual case.149 The court characterized its
holding in Borello as striking a balance between rigid
application of the common law control test and a flexible
approach that allows for deference to a statute’s remedial or
protective purpose.150
It is entirely plausible to read Dynamex as consistent with
the balancing approach in Borello. In Dynamex, a delivery
company sought mandamus to compel the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County to vacate its order denying class certification for
two delivery driver plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had alleged that the
company’s misclassification of drivers as independent
contractors rather than employees violated provisions of a state
Industrial Wage Commission (IWC) wage order governing the
transportation industry and various sections of the Labor
145. See id. at 407 (“By any applicable test, we must dismiss the growers’
claims here.”).
146. Id. at 404.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 406 (“We agree that under the Act, the
‘control-of-work-details’ test for determining whether a person rendering
service to another is an ‘employee’ or an excluded ‘independent contractor’
must be applied with deference to the purposes of the protective legislation.”).
149. See id. at 404 (“[T]he individual factors cannot be applied
mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their weight depends
often on particular combinations.” (citation omitted)); see also supra note 119
and accompanying text (enumerating the additional factors).
150. See id. at 406–07 (discussing the “balance to be struck when deciding
whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor for purposes of
the [Workers’ Compensation Act]”).
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Code.151 The controversy concerned language in the wage order
defining “employee” as any person engaged, suffered, or
permitted to work by an employer.152 The core issue presented
was whether the trial court erred in relying upon this “suffer or
permit to work” language when determining whether
individuals were employees covered by the provisions of the
wage order, or instead, excluded independent contractors.153 The
California Supreme Court held that the trial court properly
relied on the “suffer or permit to work” language in the wage
order.154 Further, the court announced that the appropriate test
for whether an individual meets the “suffer or permit to work”
standard for the purposes of a wage order is the ABC Test.155
According to the court, “the IWC has the authority, in
promulgating its wage orders, to define the standard for
determining when an entity is to be considered an employer for
purposes of the applicable wage order.”156 The IWC, in choosing
the “suffer or permit to work” language, adopted a standard that
history and California Supreme Court precedent recognize as
exceptionally broad.157 Moreover, the court said Borello required
it to give deference to the remedial purpose of the work order at
issue, which in this case was to secure minimum wages and
maximum hours for workers in the transportation industry.158
However, the court acknowledged that the “suffer or permit to
work” standard, if applied literally, would encompass even those
151. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 5–7
(Cal. 2018) (summarizing the facts and procedural history of the case).
152. See id. at 13 (quoting the language of the relevant wage order).
153. See id. (stating that the court granted the petition for review to
consider this question).
154. See id. at 30 (“[T]he suffer or permit to work standard is relevant and
significant in assessing the scope of the category of workers that the wage
order was intended to protect.”).
155. See id. at 35 (concluding that the ABC Test is the test most
appropriate and consistent with the history and purpose of the suffer or permit
to work standard in California’s wage orders).
156. Id. at 25.
157. See id. at 32 (“[T]he suffer or permit to work standard must be
interpreted and applied broadly to include within the covered ‘employee’
category all individual workers who can reasonably be viewed as working in
the [hiring entity’s business].” (quotation omitted)).
158. See id. at 29 (“[T]he Borello standard itself emphasizes the primacy
of statutory purpose in resolving the employee or independent contractor
question.”).
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workers
traditionally—and
indisputably—classified
as
independent contractors.159 Accordingly, it brought in the ABC
Test to distinguish those workers who “could not reasonably
have been intended by the wage order to be treated as employees
of the hiring business.”160
A comparison of these cases reveals three takeaways. First,
nowhere in Dynamex did the California Supreme Court indicate
that Borello was no longer good law, nor that the ABC Test
should be applied by default to answer all employment
classification questions.161 To the contrary, the Dynamex court
looked favorably upon Borello and endeavored to give it
continued effect by adhering to its admonition that courts
should evaluate employment status in light of the history and
remedial purpose of the wage order at issue.162
Second, the Dynamex court’s invocation of the ABC Test
appears to have been the result of grappling with, on the one
hand, the proper amount of deference owed to the IWC wage
order’s exceedingly broad definition of employee and, on the
other, the practical reality that not all workers could possibly be
employees.163 The court reasoned that if the wage order’s
standard for the definition of employee would unreasonably
subsume all conceivable workers, some principled rule was still
needed to govern the distinction between employees and
independent contractors.164 The ABC Test thus offered the court
an option to strike the balance it sought on the facts in Dynamex.
In short, the Dynamex decision stands for the proposition that,
when the language of a remedial statute or regulation demands
a stricter employee classification standard, one way to give that
standard effect without completely eliminating the category of
independent contractors is to apply the ABC Test.165 For other
purposes, there is no reason to read Dynamex as requiring
159. See id. at 30 (“It is true that, when applied literally and without
consideration of its history and purposes in the context of California’s wage
orders, the suffer or permit to work language . . . does not
distinguish . . . traditional independent contractors . . . .”).
160. Id.
161. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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application of that test in lieu of the common law control test
used in Borello.
Finally, nothing in either Borello or Dynamex suggests that
the question of which test to apply should hinge on the industry
or occupation of the complaining worker. The Borello court, for
its part, relied on its observation that worker relationships are
many and varied to justify its flexible approach.166 And the
Dynamex court diverged from Borello only because it interpreted
the wage order in question as having necessitated it.167
In sum, while it may be tempting to read Dynamex as a pure
departure from Borello insofar as the former introduced an
employment classification test theretofore unknown in
California jurisprudence—indeed, some scholars have168—to do
so would be to elide over nuanced factual differences between
the two cases and the Dynamex court’s efforts to cabin its
holding narrowly.
B.

Which Test Is Best?

California AB 5 incorporates both Borello’s control-of-work
test and Dynamex’s ABC Test. The latter applies by default for
all employee classification questions under state law,169 while
the former applies in a handful of explicitly excepted
industries.170 This bifurcated classification regime raises new
legal and policy questions. The most obvious category of
questions is whether one test—or a combination of the two—is
better than the other, either objectively or when considered in
relation to a specific purpose. A related inquiry is whether
AB 5’s approach is consistent with or diverges from the
California Supreme Court’s rationale for introducing the ABC
Test in Dynamex in the first place. The second major category of

166. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 154–155 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 38, at II.-115 (“Part II discusses how
the Dynamex decision represents a departure from common law precedent and
examines possible effects of the change.”).
169. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 2(a)(1) (requiring application of the ABC
Test for the purposes of the Labor Code, the Unemployment Insurance Code,
and all wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission).
170. See id. § 2(b) (listing exceptions).
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questions pertains to the consequences—intended or
otherwise—of the AB 5 regime.
It may seem obvious that asking which of two tests is
objectively better in the context of a fact-dependent inquiry like
employee classification is frivolous. After all, the ever-changing
nature of employment relationships and corresponding demand
for responsive approaches have been, in large part, the driving
forces behind the proliferation of multifactor common law
tests.171 As such, each new test is only as good as its ability to
resolve the unique employee classification challenge presented
in the case that gives rise to it. In a sense, a court’s decision to
introduce a new employee classification test where old ones are
insufficient does represent a form of progress. That incremental,
case-specific improvement appears to be what one scholar had
in mind when she praised the Dynamex court for “correctly
updat[ing] common law doctrine concerning worker
misclassification to address abuses in the modern economy.”172
However, recognition that courts “can, and should, reform
outdated common law doctrine”173 in response to changing
societal norms is not a novel concept,174 nor is it the same as
proclaiming the objective supremacy of the ABC Test over the
Borello test. In determining the validity of the latter contention,
close examination of the California Supreme Court’s rationales
in both Borello and Dynamex reveals no clear answer. While it
is true the ABC Test is more concise, comprising only three
factors175 to Borello’s control-plus-thirteen,176 the Dynamex
court adopted and applied the ABC Test only in the context of
171. See supra Part I.B–C (discussing the factors that have contributed to
the proliferation of such tests).
172. Rosenfeld, supra note 38, at II.-115.
173. Id. at II.-131.
174. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 28
(Andrew L. Kaufman ed., Quid Pro Law Books 2010) (“[T]he problem which
confronts the judge is in reality a twofold one: he must first extract from the
precedents the underlying principle . . . ; he must then determine the path or
direction along which the principle is to move and develop, if it is not to wither
and die.”).
175. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 7
(Cal. 2018) (articulating the three factors of the ABC Test).
176. See S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399,
404–07 (Cal. 1989) (articulating the factors to be considered in a Borello
analysis).
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wage orders of the IWC and only because, following its own
approach in Borello, deference to the broad language and
remedial purpose of the wage order at issue necessitated doing
so.177 The Dynamex court indicated that the disadvantages of a
more flexible multifactor test were heightened in the context of
a wage order pertaining to minimum wages and maximum
hours, but remained silent as to whether the ABC Test was
objectively better than the Borello approach for all use cases.178
To the contrary, the Dynamex court acknowledged that there
could be advantages to using a multifactor test such as the
“economic realities” test used in the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act context, but declined to adopt it because
California case law interpreting the “suffer or permit to work”
language of the wage order in question predated the federal
adoption of that test.179 Lastly, the Dynamex court did not
purport to part with its own acknowledgement in Borello that
rigid application of a single standard could not adequately
capture the variety of work relationships present in the labor
market.180 A close analysis of Borello and Dynamex thus
demonstrates that the California Supreme Court saw the ABC
Test not as the best available employee classification test for all
applications, but as a useful device through which to marry
precedent interpreting the “suffer or permit to work” standard
as used in California wage orders with the practical necessity of
preserving a meaningful category of independent contractors.181

177. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Dynamex court’s rationale).
178. See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35 (“We find merit in the concerns noted
above regarding the disadvantages, particularly in the wage and hour context,
inherent in relying upon a multifactor, all the circumstances standard for
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors.”).
179. See id. at 33 (“A multifactor standard—like the economic reality
standard or the Borello standard—that calls for consideration of all potentially
relevant factual distinctions in different employment arrangements on a
case-by-case, totality-of-the-circumstances basis has its advantages.”).
180. See Borello, 769 P.2d at 404 (acknowledging that the “control” test,
“applied rigidly and in isolation, is often of little use in evaluating the infinite
variety of service arrangements”).
181. See Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35 (concluding that it is most consistent
with the history and purpose of the suffer or permit to work standard in
California’s wage orders to interpret that standard as requiring hiring entities
to demonstrate each factor of the ABC Test to establish that a worker is an
independent contractor).
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The California legislature’s treatment of the ABC Test in
AB 5 is different in character. First, rather than drawing on the
history and purpose of certain statutory language as the basis
for which to distinguish between employment relationships that
warrant application of the ABC Test as opposed to those for
which Borello suffices, AB 5 makes the distinction at the
industry or occupational level.182 That is to say, AB 5 invokes
the ABC Test not to give proper effect to existing statutory
language (as the Dynamex court did), but rather to declare that
whole occupations should be subject to a more stringent
employee classification test.183
Second, AB 5 explicitly codified the ABC Test used in
Dynamex “[f]or purposes of the provisions of [the Labor Code]
and the Unemployment Insurance Code, and for the wage orders
of the Industrial Welfare Commission.”184 The careful reader
will find this language to be an expansion of the holding in
Dynamex. Indeed, Dynamex narrowly pertained to a wage order
of the IWC whose exceedingly broad definition of “employ”
necessitated invocation of an employee classification test that
would not unduly include workers traditionally recognized as
independent contractors.185 For that purpose, the Dynamex
court adopted the ABC Test.186 Nothing in the opinion suggests
that the court intended use of the ABC Test to extend to all
statutory definitions of “employ,” or to situations in which the
Borello test would suffice without subsuming traditional
independent contractors. In fact, AB 5 curiously notes that
“[n]othing in this act is intended to affect the application of
alternative definitions from the IWC wage orders of the term
‘employ,’ which were not addressed by the holding of
Dynamex,”187 suggesting the legislature was duly aware of the
narrowness of the Dynamex holding. And yet, the bill
182. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 2(b) (listing occupations that are excepted
from application of the ABC Test).
183. See Trey Kovacs, California to Eliminate Independent Work,
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/2UC9-7VTZ
(arguing that the ABC Test would effectively make “employee” the default
classification of workers in the state of California).
184. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 2(a)(1).
185. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
187. Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 1(f) (emphasis added).
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simultaneously expanded use of the ABC Test to all manner of
new applications outside the IWC wage order context,188 thus
accomplishing a feat the Dynamex court saw no need to take on.
That is to say, while the Dynamex court appears to have
remained true to Borello’s spirit of flexibility, the California
legislature appears to have decided emphatically that the ABC
Test is in some way objectively better than the control-of-work
test.
It bears addressing in a discussion of the relative merits of
both tests that any attempt to regulate employee
misclassification involves an inherently recursive inquiry:
whether a state perceives itself to have an employee
misclassification problem necessarily depends on how it defines
employee misclassification to begin with. If any state proceeds
to adopt a new, stricter employee classification test, then the
urgency of its employee misclassification “problem” naturally
balloons immediately. In that sense, the ABC Test may be better
than the control-of-work test for the purpose of opening the
California courts’ doors to a larger number of plaintiffs the
legislature believed had suffered some wrong, but that belief
itself is a matter of perspective that says nothing about the
objective supremacy of one test over the other.
To be sure, AB 5’s expansive application of the ABC Test
was an exercise of the legislative prerogative.189 The California
legislature was not bound to produce a bill that perfectly—or
even remotely—mirrored the California Supreme Court’s
holding in Dynamex, and indeed, it could have enacted AB 5 in
the absence of any new employee classification jurisprudence.
What is interesting about AB 5’s expansive adoption of the ABC
Test is not that it diverges from the narrow Dynamex holding,
but that it invokes Dynamex at all.190 This is especially true in
light of the opinion’s extensive treatment of the advantages and

188. See id. § 2(a)(1) (stating that the ABC Test should apply for all
purposes of the Labor Code and the Unemployment Insurance Code).
189. See Rosenfeld, supra note 38, at II.-131 (arguing that AB 5 reflects
legislative acceptance of the court’s responsibility to update common law
doctrine to reflect the times).
190. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 1 (invoking Dynamex as a motivating
factor behind the bill).

CALIFORNIA EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION

935

disadvantages of different tests for different purposes,191 and the
fact that the Dynamex court’s ultimate conclusion as to which
test to apply was motivated by a view that it was bound by the
history and purpose of the suffer or permit to work standard in
California,192 a restriction to which the legislature—in contrast
to the court—was not subject. Nevertheless, AB 5 addresses
Dynamex as if it had entirely upended employee classification
jurisprudence within the state,193 and as if the legislature had
no choice but to clarify—rather than determine outright—its
holding’s application to state employment law.194
The text and structure of AB 5 appear to signal some
discomfort on the part of the legislature with the idea of broadly
adopting the ABC Test. First, the preamble itself acknowledges
the narrowness of the Dynamex holding with respect to wage
orders of the IWC, noting that nothing in the bill should be
interpreted to affect the application of alternative definitions of
“employ” in such orders other than the “suffer or permit to work”
definition addressed in that case.195 Second, the bill retains the
Borello test for a number of excepted industries.196 The bill does
not explain why the legislature selected those occupations to
receive special treatment, but there appears to have been a
process by which industry groups lobbied for exceptions, some of
which were met with denial.197 It is relatively easy to imagine
191. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 33–36
(Cal. 2018) (discussing the various employee classification tests used in other
jurisdictions).
192. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
193. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 1(a) (citing the California Supreme
Court’s decision in Dynamex as the very first consideration for the bill’s
enactment).
194. See id. § 1(d) (“It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act
to include provisions that would codify the decision of the California Supreme
Court in Dynamex and would clarify the decision’s application in state law.”).
195. See id. § 1(f) (“Dynamex . . . interpreted . . . the ‘suffer or permit’
definition, from the wage orders of the [IWC]. Nothing in this act is intended
to affect the application of alternative definitions from the IWC wage orders of
the term ‘employ,’ which were not addressed by the holding of Dynamex.”).
196. See id. § 2(b) (listing exceptions).
197. See Rosenfeld, supra note 38, at II.-128 (discussing lobbying efforts by
various industries to secure exceptions); see also Kate Conger & Noam
Scheiber, California Bill Makes App-Based Companies Treat Workers as
Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/NPJ7-ZCQ9 (stating
that Uber and Lyft failed to get an exception under AB 5).
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why these groups would have petitioned for excepted status: the
three prongs of the ABC Test are exceedingly difficult for hiring
entities to prove.198 One might question whether a test that
achieves near uniformity of outcome in a single direction is truly
beneficial reform. In any case, the fact that the legislature
singled out certain occupations for more lenient treatment
under the Borello test is evidence that it recognized the need for
some degree of flexibility in its employee classification regime.
The question that naturally arises in the presence of this
recognition is whether AB 5’s employee classification scheme
effectively strikes the proper balance between flexibility and the
bill’s stated purpose of reducing misclassification in the state.199
It likely does not. First, it is not clear that either the ABC or
Borello tests are flexible enough to respond adequately to
rampant innovation in the labor economy.200
Second, AB 5 strips hiring entities in non-excepted
industries of the ability to argue in court that the Borello factors
support independent contractor status.201 This is odd not only in
light of the ever-evolving nature of work and employment
relationships, but because neither the Dynamex court nor the
California legislature found courts wholly incapable of reliably
applying Borello.202
Third, the ABC Test itself “perpetuates a deficiency” in
agency and employment law because it “cannot be used to
evaluate situations where workers functionally serve as
independent contractors but are economically vulnerable
because of a dependence on a single employer or single group of

198. See Kovacs, supra note 183 (arguing that the ABC Test is “nearly
impossible to satisfy”).
199. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 1(b)–(e) (citing misclassification of
workers as a primary purpose of the bill).
200. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (noting that Uber’s novel sharing economy business model created
significant challenges for applying the common law test and suggesting the
need for reform); Lobel, supra note 70, at 94 (discussing the challenges the
platform economy presents to existing employment law).
201. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 2(a)(1) (applying the ABC Test by default
to all non-excepted industries).
202. See id. § 2(b) (retaining the Borello test for at least some applications);
see also id. § 1 (listing the legislature’s purposes for enacting the bill, none of
which is failure by the courts to reliably apply the Borello test).
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employers.”203 Unlike under the Borello test, hiring entities
seeking to demonstrate independent contractor status under the
ABC Test must meet all of the test’s prongs in order to prevail.204
Prong “C” in particular is problematic because it requires hiring
entities to somehow validate at the outset of a contract for labor
or services whether a worker is independently engaged in the
kind of work subject to the agreement.205 It further fails to
consider the growing class of entrepreneurs who work as
independent contractors only to earn supplemental income.206
According to a report by the Competitive Enterprise Institute,
“[t]hese individuals might choose to work for only one client.
Such
an
individual
who
operates
with
complete
autonomy . . . could nonetheless fail an ABC test because the
individual chooses not to actively market the individual’s
services to others.”207 In sum, AB 5 amounts to a statutory
declaration that workers in industries not explicitly excepted by
the bill are employees,208 leaving hiring entities in those
industries no recourse but to lobby for an amendment or
challenge their un-excepted status other than through statutory
amendment or referendum ballot measure.209
Finally, in adopting the ABC Test, AB 5 wholly ignores a
central criticism of status-based classification generally.
Richard Carlson has argued that the effort and trouble required
to draw an effective and fair bright line between employees and
203. Pearce & Silva, supra note 43, at 2.
204. See Cal. Assemb. B. No. 5 § 2(a)(1) (using an “and” rather than an “or”
operator to relate the three factors of the ABC Test).
205. See id. (requiring, as prong “C,” that “[t]he person is customarily
engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the
same nature as that involved in the work performed”); Kovacs, supra note 183
(questioning whether hiring entities have the capacity or should have the
responsibility to investigate workers’ day-to-day activities beyond their ability
to perform the job in question).
206. See COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., THE CASE AGAINST THE PROTECTING
THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE ACT 8 (2019), https://perma.cc/Q9UL-SX9W (PDF)
(discussing the disadvantages of prong “C” for hiring entities).
207. Id.
208. See Kovacs, supra note 183 (arguing that the ABC Test effectively
makes “employee” the default classification for workers in California).
209. See Kerr, supra note 10 (stating that Uber, Lyft, Doordash,
Postmates, and Instacart invested $110 million in support of Proposition 22, a
ballot measure to regulate the online platform economy outside the scope of
AB 5).
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independent contractors might be worth it in “a simpler world
in which ‘employees’ were naturally equated with persons
needing statutory protection, and non-employees equated with
persons needing none.”210 However, Carlson says that, because
in reality workers often toe the line between designations, a
more practical approach would be to afford benefits and
protections based on the character of the transactions between
the parties instead of their status.211 He proposes to “regulate
compensation for services rather than ‘employee’ wages,
workplaces rather than places where ‘employees’ work, and
discrimination in the selection and retention of individuals to
work instead of discrimination against ‘employees.’”212
On the one hand, it is hard to see how Carlson’s approach
would contravene Borello, Dynamex, or the California
legislature’s stated intentions in passing AB 5. On the other
hand, it is easy to see that AB 5 is inconsistent with such an
approach. Categorically subjecting entire occupations to the
ABC Test—especially given that test’s overwhelmingly likely
determination that individuals providing any paid service are
employees—fundamentally
overlooks
Carlson’s
central
contention that no court or legislature has successfully
articulated a reliable standard by which to classify workers
absent some deeper consideration of the character of the
transactions between the parties.213
C.

What Consequences Result from AB 5’s Bifurcated
Approach?

The negative implications of AB 5 are potentially
far-ranging, likely unintentional, and currently little
understood.214 The passage of AB 5 engendered immediate
210. Carlson, supra note 62, at 299–300.
211. See id. at 301 (describing Carlson’s proposed better approach).
212. Id.
213. See id. (describing the failures of courts and legislatures to articulate
a workable status-based classification test).
214. See Rosenfeld, supra note 38, at II.-131 (“[I]t is still too early to tell
how AB 5 will impact workers, businesses, and other stakeholders in
California and beyond . . . .”); Natalie Kalbakian, Workers of the Gaming
World, Unite! The Uncertain Future of the Video Game Industry in the
Aftermath of AB 5, 40 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 351, 371 (2020) (“Because of the
overlap in employment classification practices between the video game
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confusion, outrage, and litigation from industries seeking to
clarify or change their excepted status.215 This subpart
addresses the direct consequences of the bill, as well as reactions
from non-excepted industry and their effect on the bill’s ability
to accomplish its stated goals.
1.

Direct Consequences

Much has been made in the media of opposition to AB 5 by
ridesharing and other gig economy companies, whose business
models depend on classifying drivers and delivery workers as
independent contractors and who have not offered traditional
wage protections or benefits for those workers.216 This is
perhaps unsurprising, as gig economy opportunities have
become increasingly popular in recent years,217 and the history
of AB 5 suggests that negative public sentiment toward these
companies’ business models was a motivating factor behind the
bill.218 But the larger media narrative around AB 5’s impact in
the context of companies like Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash has
obscured its effects on less sophisticated or more fragmented
sectors such as non-profit theater, wine-tasting, tourism,
independent video game development, translation and
interpretation services, freelance writing, and music.219
industry and traditional gig companies, AB 5 may capture a broader swath of
the state’s economy than the legislature expressly intended.”); Gary
Quackenbush, Nonprofit Theater the Latest Industry to Oppose California’s
New Independent Contractor Law, N. BAY BUS. J. (Feb. 27, 2020),
https://perma.cc/L5VY-6LPQ (discussing nonprofit theater, wine-tasting, and
other tourism industry companies’ opposition to and confusion about the bill).
215. See, e.g., Faiz Siddiqui, Uber and Lyft Must Make Their Drivers in
California Full Employees, Judge Rules, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2020, 6:24 PM)
[hereinafter Siddiqui, Uber and Lyft], https://perma.cc/6VNS-T8PE
(discussing ridesharing companies’ opposition and legal challenges).
216. See id. (describing ridesharing companies’ reliance on an independent
contractor model).
217. See Sebastian Herrera, Uber, Lyft Drivers Torn as California Law
Could Reclassify Them, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/N4GQ-6PZV (stating that Lyft claims to have 325,000 drivers
in California; Uber more than 200,000).
218. See supra Part II.A (discussing the motivating factors behind the bill).
219. See Quackenbush, supra note 214 (discussing AB 5’s effects on
non-profit theater and other tourism and cultural sectors); Kalbakian, supra
note 214, at 371 (video game development); AM. TRANSLATORS ASS’N,
STATEMENT OF POSITION REGARDING CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 5 AND REQUEST
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Critiques of AB 5 from these sectors largely focus on the
speed with which the bill passed, the arbitrariness of some of its
terms, and the likelihood that compliance will result in
reduction of available services or increased prices to
consumers.220 California attorneys who specialize in labor and
non-profit business law have decried AB 5’s complexity, calling
it “not workable for many sectors of the economy,” “poorly
written,” and “not well thought through.”221 These critiques are
not merely academic. For example, major media outlet Vox
severed relationships with hundreds of freelance writers and
editors rather than reclassify them as employees.222 In May
2020, the Lake Tahoe Music Festival announced that it was
shutting down after forty years due in part to AB 5.223 In view of
these challenges, Maria Figueroa, Director of Labor and Policy
Research at the Worker Institute at Cornell University’s School
of Industrial Labor Relations, advised other states considering
similar legislation to “hold off” until they can “come up with
legislation that would be narrow enough in terms of its
parameters to cover platform workers . . . [but] would enable
these states to avoid these challenges.”224

EXEMPTION (2020), https://perma.cc/EF4U-WR3J (PDF) (freelance
translators and interpreters); Eli Rosenberg, Can California Rein in Tech’s Gig
Platforms? A Primer on the Bold State Law that Will Try, WASH. POST (Jan.
14, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://perma.cc/P8Z3-5X38 (freelance writing); Nate
Hertweck, What California’s New Gig Economy Labor Law Means for Music
Makers, RECORDING ACAD. (Sept. 20, 2019, 2:13 PM), https://perma.cc/5UABDZ6Y (producers, engineers, studio and live musicians, and publicists).
220. See Quackenbush, supra note 214 (quoting executive director of
Californians for the Arts and California Arts Advocates Julie Baker with
reference to AB 5’s quick passage and legal ambiguities); id. (quoting executive
director of Transcendence Theater Company Brad Surosky’s suggestions that
AB 5 may result in cuts to summer and educational programs).
221. Id. (quoting labor law attorney Lisa Ann Hilario with Spaulding,
McCullough & Tansil LLP and Daryl Reese with Johnson Thomas, Attorneys
at Law, PC).
222. See Rosenberg, supra note 219 (discussing Vox’s decision not to
reclassify writers and editors in light of AB 5’s passage).
223. See Bonnie Dyer, Update for 2021, LAKE TAHOE MUSIC FESTIVAL (May
13, 2020), https://perma.cc/SKN7-7ZVA (“Early in 2020, new CA employment
law requirements added to the challenge of meeting our financial
goals . . . . So we will bring our festival to a close . . . .”).
224. Rosenberg, supra note 219.
FOR
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Non-Excepted Industry Reactions

Platform companies like Uber and Lyft initially confronted
the changing employee classification landscape in California on
three fronts. First, both companies formally engaged with the
California legislature during the drafting of AB 5 to seek
exceptions or alternative classification pathways for gig
economy workers.225 Second, in the immediate aftermath of
AB 5’s passage, both companies sued to enjoin enforcement of
the bill against them.226 Third, in the background, Uber
accelerated development of a set of new features designed to
increase driver flexibility while using the app, including adding
the ability to see estimated trip fares up front and then reject a
trip without penalty.227
Uber appears to have based its new feature development on
prior litigation outcomes. Analysis of earlier California cases
holding that driver plaintiffs were misclassified as independent
contractors indicates that those cases may have come down
differently if brought today, in a world where drivers benefit
from even greater flexibility.228 As Uber, in particular, has
invested in new technologies designed to provide drivers with
greater autonomy,229 many of the factors that contributed to the
court’s finding in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.230 are now
irrelevant or greatly diminished in their importance.231
Nevertheless, Uber’s and Lyft’s initial legal and political
challenges to AB 5 ultimately failed.232 Meanwhile, a coalition
225. See Conger & Scheiber, supra note 197 (discussing the process by
which Uber and Lyft lobbied for an exception under AB 5).
226. See Siddiqui, Uber and Lyft, supra note 215 (detailing Uber’s and
Lyft’s injunction suits).
227. See Faiz Siddiqui, Uber’s Secret Project to Bolster Its Case Against
AB5, California’s Gig-Worker Law, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2020, 7:00 AM)
[hereinafter Siddiqui, Uber’s Secret Project], https://perma.cc/Z4RH-T7PJ
(detailing Uber’s “Project Luigi”).
228. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141–53 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (discussing numerous factual elements such as the existence of
driver handbooks, which are no longer in use by the company).
229. See Siddiqui, Uber’s Secret Project, supra note 227 (discussing Uber’s
efforts to increase driver flexibility through added app features).
230. 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
231. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
232. See Uber and Lyft Must Comply with Labor Law AB 5, Appeals Court
Orders, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020, 6:07 PM), https://perma.cc/C94Q-527X (“A
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of platform companies including Uber, Lyft, Postmates,
Instacart, and DoorDash succeeded in funding a $205 million
campaign in support of a referendum ballot measure that carved
their industry out of AB 5 altogether.233 Proposition 22, which
passed during the November 2020 election, excludes “app-based
drivers” from treatment under any other provision of
law—including AB 5—for the purposes of determining
employment status.234 It then categorizes app-based drivers as
independent contractors provided that the company whose app
they use satisfies four conditions: (a) the company does not
unilaterally determine drivers’ work schedules; (b) the company
does not require drivers to accept any specific trip or delivery
request; (c) the company does not restrict drivers from
performing rideshare or delivery services through other
networks except while engaged on a trip or delivery; and (d) the
company does not restrict drivers from working in any other
lawful occupation.235
Proposition 22 further allows companies to offer certain
benefits to app-based drivers without compromising those
drivers’ statuses as independent contractors.236 For example,
Section 7453 commits companies who contract with app-based
drivers to provide an earnings guarantee calculated using the
state’s minimum wage, Section 7454 provides for a healthcare
subsidy, Section 7455 requires companies to ensure certain loss
and liability protection for drivers, Section 7456 protects
app-based drivers from discrimination, and Section 7457
mandates that companies implement a sexual harassment

California appeals court on Thursday upheld an order requiring Uber and Lyft
to treat their California drivers as employees instead of independent
contractors.”).
233. See California Proposition 22, App-Based Drivers as Contractors and
Labor Policies Initiative (2020), BALLOTPEDIA (2020) [hereinafter Proposition
22], https://perma.cc/Q67E-MARZ (“Yes on Proposition 22 received $205.37
million, which was the most funds that an initiative campaign had ever
received in California (not adjusted for inflation).”).
234. See id. § 7451 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . an
app-based driver is an independent contractor and not an employee or agent
with respect to his or her relationship with a network company if . . . .”).
235. See id. (listing conditions).
236. See id. § 7453 (providing for a minimum earnings guarantee); id.
§ 7454 (providing healthcare subsidies for certain drivers who use the app for
substantial periods of time each week).
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policy intended to protect app-based drivers.237 While the
equivalence between these provisions and those already
afforded employees under California law is the subject of some
debate,238 it is worth pointing out that the California legislature
conceivably could have exercised a greater degree of control over
ultimate outcomes for app-based drivers in the state if it had
engaged with the companies that run such platforms from the
start, instead of forcing the ABC Test upon an industry that
decidedly
strains
traditional
notions
of
the
employee-independent contractor dichotomy.239
Proposition 22’s inclusion of various benefits for app-based
drivers whom companies seek to maintain as independent
contractors illustrates a larger issue with AB 5. Namely, at least
some companies the California legislature perceived as
misclassifying employees might want or be willing to offer
certain benefits to app users, but simply cannot do so under the
current statutory scheme without risking penalties.240 Uber
CEO Dara Khosrowshahi has spoken publicly at length about
the need for a “third way” to classify drivers that is neither
employee nor independent contractor to avoid precisely this
conundrum.241 The company has also created a position called
Head of Marketplace Policy, Fairness, and Research, and hired
Alexandra Rosenblat—one of its harshest labor policy critics—to

237. See id. §§ 7453–7457 (detailing earnings guarantees and required
benefits for app-based drivers).
238. See, e.g., Ken Jacobs & Michael Reich, The Uber/Lyft Ballot Initiative
Guarantees Only $5.64 an Hour, UC BERKELEY LAB. CTR. (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://perma.cc/C89H-275G (concluding that Proposition 22’s provision for
minimum earnings guarantees is below California’s minimum wage).
239. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Lauren Feiner, Uber CEO Advocates for “Third Way” to
Classify Gig Workers While Fighting California Labor Lawsuit, CNBC (Aug.
10, 2020, 9:11 AM), https://perma.cc/3CSC-XDS9 (stating that Uber’s CEO
“had urged [then-President] Trump and Congress to consider updating labor
laws more broadly to support gig workers who cherish the flexibility of contract
work but also desire the protection of employee status”).
241. See Dara Khosrowshahi, I Am the C.E.O. of Uber. Gig Workers Deserve
Better., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/CK4M-XXNV (“Our
current employment system is outdated and unfair. It forces every worker to
choose between being an employee with more benefits but less flexibility, or
an independent contractor with more flexibility but almost no safety net.”).
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fill it.242 Rosenblat’s responsibility in that role is to “get the
company to take into consideration the experiences and point of
view of drivers, especially at the product level,” and Uber said
they appointed her specifically because the company wants
“people at Uber who care about driver issues and who aren’t
afraid to challenge our thinking on any given issue.”243
Reasonable minds could disagree as to whether a
tech-company-under-fire’s decision to hire an out-spoken
detractor denotes meaningful progress or public relations
posturing, but regardless of what one thinks about Uber’s
underlying motivations, the creation of such a position
demonstrates at least some level of commitment to protecting
drivers in ways that do not run afoul of state misclassification
regimes.
In fact, Uber’s more recent rhetoric appears to envision
goals grander than mere compliance with state law—a stark
shift from the Uber of 2010.244 With Khosrowshahi at the helm,
Uber’s public stance on worker classification has been clear and
consistent, centering the unworkability of the existing
employment classification dichotomy and indicating an
unwavering duty of accountability to bolster worker flexibility,
protections, and benefits—if only it is given the chance to do so
through public-private cooperation.245
Of course, the resulting irony of Proposition 22’s success is
that it has stripped AB 5 of its ability to regulate an industry
whose employee classification practices were a major motivating
factor for the bill’s passage in the first place,246 leaving a piece
of legislation which is effective against only those
less-sophisticated and relatively under-resourced industries the
242. See Brody Ford, Uber Hires Prominent Critic to Focus on Treatment
of Drivers, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/MK6J-LX7S
(describing the role and its responsibilities).
243. Id.
244. See Kalanick, supra note 2, at 7 (“Uber will roll out ridesharing on its
existing platform in any market where the regulators have tacitly approved
doing so.”).
245. See Khosrowshahi, supra note 241 (“This is the time for Uber to come
together with government to raise the standard of work for all. The
opportunity is now, and the responsibility is ours. The world has changed, and
we must change with it.”).
246. See Gonzalez Statement, supra note 123 (“Some of the many workers
who will benefit include . . . delivery and ride-hail drivers.”).
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legislature may not have intended to sweep into AB 5’s scope.247
In the meantime, Uber, Lyft, and companies like them will
continue to operate in California under rules they effectively
crafted themselves.
The merits of Proposition 22 as an alternative to AB 5 for
app-based drivers are the subject of some debate. In one sense,
Proposition 22 may contribute to the problem of proliferating
employee classification tests by introducing a new one.248
Further, there are some arguments that the employment-like
benefits it purports to secure for app-based drivers are
insufficient compared to those they would receive if they were
categorized as employees.249 Lastly, even if Proposition 22 is a
better alternative to AB 5, its viability as a model for addressing
employee misclassification broadly is questionable beyond the
singular context of app-based work. As a practical matter,
Proposition 22’s specific attention to employment law issues
raised in the gig economy may be difficult to replicate across
dozens of other industries on a case-by-case basis, given the cost
alone of mounting such a campaign.250 However, each of these
critiques of Proposition 22 is a critique one could fairly level
against any legislation by referendum.251 The broader question
the success of Proposition 22 presents in light of the extensive
saga of California’s AB 5 is whether a statute like AB 5 could
ever serve as a viable model for other states ostensibly seeking
to reduce employment misclassification. In passing AB 5, did the
California legislature solve a real problem, or—in its haste to
react to public anti-ridesharing company sentiment—did it
ignore the learnings of hundreds of years of worker classification
jurisprudence, unintentionally burden non-target industries,
and ultimately kick the proverbial can down the road on the
question of ridesharing driver worker classification status?
247. See supra notes 213–224 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
250. See Michael Hiltzik, Column: Uber and Lyft Just Made Their
Campaign to Keep Exploiting Workers the Costliest in History, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 8, 2020, 12:40 PM), https://perma.cc/XHE4-LAQ7 (noting that industry
groups have historically spent tens of millions of dollars on successful
California referendum ballot initiatives in the past).
251. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Top Judge Calls Calif. Government
‘Dysfunctional’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2009), https://perma.cc/A3Q4-X8C6
(reporting on a state judge’s criticisms of the California referendum process).
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3.

Later Developments

The saga of AB 5 is far from over. In the year since the
original draft of this Note was accepted for publication, a group
of ridesharing drivers mounted a nominally-successful state
constitutional challenge to Proposition 22 in California state
court, Castellanos v. California.252 An industry-backed coalition
of Proposition 22 supporters intervened on the side of the
California Department of Justice in defense of the initiative.253
In an unpublished final order, the California Superior Court for
the County of Alameda held that Proposition 22 violates the
California State Constitution because it “limits the power of a
future legislature to define app-based drivers as workers subject
to workers’ compensation law.”254 Specifically, the court found
that, because the California constitution grants plenary
authority to the state legislature to create workers’
compensation laws unlimited by any provision of the state
constitution,255 and because Proposition 22 was a statutory
referendum—itself a creature of constitutional creation—which
limited the legislature’s power to make workers’ compensation
laws respecting app-based drivers,256 the referendum was in

252. See Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandate at 11–12,
Castellanos v. California, No. RG21088725 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 20, 2021)
[hereinafter Castellanos Order], https://perma.cc/Q7XZ-L67K (PDF)
(summarizing the court’s reasons for finding Proposition 22 unconstitutional);
Brian Chen & Laura Padin, Prop 22 Was a Failure for California’s App-Based
Workers. Now, It’s Also Unconstitutional., NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Sept. 16,
2021), https://perma.cc/L7Q3-W5CJ (summarizing the timeline of Proposition
22’s passage and legal challenges to Proposition 22).
253. See Daniel Wiessner, Group Moves to Revive Gig-Driver Exemption
from Calif. Law, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2021, 7:08 PM), https://perma.cc/6XJV25KA (“[Protect App-Based Drivers and Services] was permitted to intervene
in the lawsuit challenging Prop 22, which was filed by the Service Employees
International Union and several gig drivers.”).
254. Castellanos Order, supra note 252, at 11.
255. See CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 (providing that the legislature shall have
the power to create workers’ compensation laws “unlimited by any provision
of this Constitution.”).
256. See Proposition 22, supra note 233, § 7451 (“Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, including, but not limited to, the Labor Code . . . , an
app-based driver is an independent contractor and not an employee or agent
with respect to the app-based driver’s relationship with a network company if
[certain] conditions are met.”); Castellanos Order, supra note 252, at 2–3 (“As
a result, app-based drivers have been removed from participation in the
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conflict with the state constitution.257 Further, because the text
of Proposition 22 explicitly made the section at issue
non-severable, the court found the entire initiative to be
unconstitutional.258 Finally, the court added that Section
7465(c)(4) of Proposition 22 is unconstitutional because it
“defines unrelated legislation as an ‘amendment’ and is not
germane to Proposition 22’s stated ‘theme, purpose, or
subject.’”259
Following the decision of the California Superior Court in
Castellanos, supporters and intervenors in the case immediately
filed notices of appeal.260 Although their reasons for appealing
are different—the DOJ seeks to protect the integrity of the
state’s referendum initiative system, while the industry-backed
coalition is mainly focused on the constitutionality of
Proposition 22261—it is difficult to ignore the irony that
Castellanos ultimately aligns the state’s and the ridesharing
companies’ interests against AB 5 as originally enacted. Time
will tell what the future holds for Proposition 22. But even if
Proposition 22’s advocates ultimately fail to save it, the central
critique of this Note remains intact: a protracted legal battle
over the constitutionality of a referendum initiative intended to
worker’s [sic] compensation system, as presently codified, because it protects
only employees, not independent contractors.”).
257. See Castellanos Order, supra note 252, at 4 (“In short, if the People
wish to use their initiative power to restrict or qualify a ‘plenary’ and
‘unlimited’ power granted to the Legislature, they must first do so by initiative
constitutional amendment, not by initiative statute.”).
258. See id. at 4–5, 12 (“When the People adopted Proposition 22, they
expressed their intention that its provisions be severable, except that, if
Section 7451 is held to be unconstitutional, the whole Act should be stricken.”).
259. Id. at 12; see also Proposition 22, supra note 233, § 7465 (defining
amendments to Proposition 22).
260. See Allsup, supra note 39 (“The Protect App-based Drivers & Services
Coalition, a group supporting Prop. 22, said it will appeal the ruling to a state
appellate court. Its filing follows a Sept. 17 notice from the California
Department of Justice about the state’s plan to appeal.”).
261. See Catherine Thorbecke, Ruling that California’s Prop. 22 Is
Unconstitutional Prompts Dueling Reactions from Gig Workers and Rideshare
Companies, ABCNEWS (Aug. 23, 2021, 4:42 PM), https://perma.cc/YN76-F7YJ
(“This ruling ignores the will of the overwhelming majority of California voters
and defies both logic and the law. You don’t have to take our word for it:
California’s Attorney General strongly defended Proposition 22’s
constitutionality in this very case . . . .” (quoting Noah Edwardsen, Uber
Spokesperson)).
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overturn a statute with which the people of California disagreed
is simply further evidence of AB 5’s broader failure. Further, the
subject matter of the pending Proposition 22 litigation—namely,
whether the initiative is constitutional—is now several steps
removed from the fundamental issue that initially gave rise to
AB 5. That distancing supports a contention that AB 5 was only
ever a hastily-crafted legislative overcompensation for a
perceived problem that in fact did not exist and with respect to
which relevant industry players were and are willing to build a
cooperative solution.
CONCLUSION
In some ways, the story of AB 5 merely emphasizes a lesson
courts began to appreciate long ago: as working relationships
evolve, simply not all of them will be susceptible of a rigid,
binary classification framework.262 Of course, this has been true
since at least the nineteenth century, when courts first diverged
from a pure control test for employee classification to tests that
considered additional factors.263 Although AB 5 reflects some
attempt on the part of the California legislature to take account
of the need for flexibility in employee classification
determinations,264 its dual-test regime in fact rigidly fixes
worker status by industry for a large portion of the economy.
AB 5’s adoption of the ABC Test by default favors consistency of
results over flexibility.265 For those occupations that have
received exceptions under the bill—in seemingly arbitrary,
piecemeal fashion266—nothing has changed. Any criticisms one
might have levied against the Borello test before AB 5’s passage
remain in force in those contexts.
But AB 5’s shortcomings run deeper than long-understood
critiques of the American legal system’s tools for distinguishing
between employees and independent contractors. Californians
did not receive the bill as an assurance that workers would be
262. See supra Part I.B (discussing the historical origins of the
employee-independent contractor dichotomy and addressing the challenges
courts faced even before the advent of New Deal-era employee protections).
263. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 196–199 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 198–213 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 196–197 and accompanying text.
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adequately protected.267 Rather, its passage fostered
tremendous economic uncertainty.268 Some individuals lost
existing work as a result.269 Others, fearing the impact AB 5
would have on their industries, spent substantial time and
funds litigating their excepted status in court.270 Many
organizations without the resources to do so worry about their
financial viability in an AB 5 world, and some of them have shut
down completely as a result.271
Moreover, the California legislature underestimated how
much capital gig economy giants would be willing to invest in
support of non-legislative pathways to achieve what is
effectively self-regulation.272 It did so in spite of demonstrated
willingness on the part of such companies to compromise on a
third classification for gig workers.273 What’s left of AB 5 now
operates only to sow confusion and apprehension among
companies and workers that were never the central driving force
behind the bill in the first place.
The tricky problem of employee classification is one that
necessarily requires extensive deliberation and individualized
attention to the variety of working relationships that have and
continue to evolve.274 The proliferation of employee classification
tests in the last 130 years is a testament to that observation.275
Employee classification has become an even thornier issue in
light of the development of the gig economy.276 Accordingly, any
legislation that aims to redefine the employee classification
standard across an entire jurisdiction should immediately
arouse suspicion. Insofar as states may have concerns about the
benefits and protections afforded to gig workers—or any other
specific industry, for that matter—they should tailor legislative
approaches to the realities and characteristics of that industry.
267. See supra notes 220–221 and accompanying text.
268. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing AB 5’s direct consequences on
industry).
269. See supra Part III.C.1.
270. See cases cited supra note 29 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part III.C.1.
272. See supra notes 232–234 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 240–243 and accompanying text.
274. See supra Parts I.C–E.
275. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Parts I.D–E.
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As the story of AB 5 makes clear, it is all but impossible to devise
a single employee classification scheme that strikes the perfect
balance between flexibility and worker protections in every
industry at the exact same time. In conclusion—and in contrast
to the grandiose claims of the bill’s author—AB 5 is not “the
global standard for worker protections for other states and
countries to follow.”277

277.

Gonzalez Statement, supra note 123.

